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HISTORICAL REVISIONISM IN JAPAN: THE PERPETUAL PLIGHT OF KOREAN ‘COMFORT WOMEN’

  • WRITTEN BY EXECUTIVE JOURNALIST: 유채은 / YOO CHAEEUN

“Money will not change my life, heal my scars, or make my memories change. We are all in our eighties. Time continues to slip away for us, but not for our cause.”1

–Koon-Ja Kim, a Korean ‘comfort woman’ (1926-2017), standing before the 2007 Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. 

Introduction

From the Meiji Restoration in the late 1900s, Japan’s radical transition from an isolationist, feudal state to an industrial, colonial empire solidified its prospective codification of expansionist military laws.2 As demonstrated through imposing universal conscription and modeling their army off of the Prussians, the nation’s opportunist policies directly aligned with its efforts to adopt and eventually supersede Western hegemony, industry, and military strength.3 However, it was not until the dawn of the 1900s that Japan rose to power on the international stage. Through their occupation across the Asia-Pacific, relentless projects such as The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere were in alignment with the Japanese government’s attempts to subordinate East, Southeast, and South Asian countries under the guise of mutual alliance and agreement.4 Nonetheless, disillusioned civilians across the globe could readily sense the leaks behind their falsified claims and systemic denialism. Thus, as the late-nineteenth century closed and the twenty-first century opened, the primary catalyst to contemporary discourse on Japan’s historical revisionism in their media and education stems from the nation’s persistent endeavors to vindicate—or even erase the evidence of—their obstructions to human rights.5 

The issue of ‘comfort women’ across the Asia-Pacific is certainly no exception to such discourse. Truthfully, it was only until the 1990s that Japan’s crimes against sexually enslaved women began garnering international attention.6 The 1930s Japanese government instituted a sexual slavery apparatus within their World War II (WWII) Imperial Army, abducting and luring young girls, estimated at least 80,000 to 500,000 of them, into military brothels, also known as ‘comfort stations.’7 Utterly stripped of their humanity, these young girls were coerced into becoming sex puppets for their belligerent scheme, a vast number of which were twelve to twenty-year-old girls from the Korean Peninsula.8 It is, however, necessary to grasp the trans-nationality of Japan’s sex slavery system and highlight the CHamoru, Chinese, Filipino, Dutch, Thai, Ryūkyūan, Vietnamese, Malay, Timorese, Indonesian, and various Eurasian groups who were also sexually abused and tormented by the Japanese. 

This paper seeks to explore the chronicle of Japanese political affairs from the 20th to 21st Century and examine their government’s generations-long systematic looting and revising of history—known as historical revisionism—regarding the issue of Korean ‘comfort women.’ From a humanitarian perspective, the objective is to analyze Japanese political interests accurately and precisely and cogitate the parallels between Japan’s historic denialism in the late 1900s and the current 2000s. This paper intends to unveil contemporary Japanese and South Korean relations, uncover the concealed truth behind World War II Japanese sex slavery, and analyze the ongoing struggle for the justice of these women, both deceased and living, that extends beyond monetary donations. 

Brief Background of Korea Proceeding World War II

Imposing dominion over Korea, Japan annexed the peninsula in 1910 and reigned colonial control until the end of World War II in 1945, creating further mass confusion and turmoil among Koreans about the future state of their country as a whole. It is to notice that there were diverse political factions in the southern and northern zones of the nation; however, all groups alike were in complete consensus to galvanize their action into successfully attaining full self-governance independent from any foreign entity, including the United States (U.S.), Soviet Union (USSR), and Japan. The Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence (CPKI), led by freedom fighter Woon-Hyung Lyuh (Yŏ Un-hyŏng), even took over temporary security issues over Korea in the interim between Japan’s surrender and the influx of U.S. troops.9 Koreans knew that they needed a mass proliferation in the support of their newly established government. Thus, it was not long until the South created the Korean People’s Republic (KPR) just as the North simultaneously established the People’s Republic of Korea (PRK) on September 6, 1945.10 Despite their strenuous efforts to formulate a sovereign nation, the United States Far East Commander (FECOM) arrived in the southern border of the nation just two days after and installed the United States Military Government in Korea, otherwise known as USAMGIK.11 The U.S. authorities refused to legitimize either the KPR or the PRK and eventually dissolved the efforts of Korean independence committees.12 They were determined to instate an American administration; the first of such efforts was to announce that Japanese colonial Governor-General Abë and his 70,000 officials were to be in command of Korean affairs.13 This expectedly caused much hostility and antagonism within the Korean populace since they were already resistant to becoming subjected to another foreign hegemonic control. Hence, by September 12, the U.S. authorities had to rescind this order quickly and remove Abë and his team from the peninsula. Still, the presence of overseas entities like the U.S. and the USSR continued to impede Korean efforts for complete independence.14 

Though many Westerners may believe the Korean War ended in 1953, only an armistice was signed, ultimately meaning that a peace treaty was never ratified, and, therefore, the war is ongoing.15 The 1953 Armistice Agreement suggested all foreign parties withdraw from the peninsula, through which China removed all its military installments from North Korea within five years. However, this stalemating of the war enables the United States, to this day, to deploy at least 28,500 troops in South Korea and install around 100 military operations on the southern border of the demilitarized zone (DMZ).16  Koreans have expressed significant grievances regarding the United States’ militarism and its seemingly unending presence in the nation, causing the armistice of “peace” to seem rather antagonistic and perilous.17 

Within the context of Korean ‘comfort women,’ the war’s irresolution is even more blatant and hostile. Not only has the war not ended, but the presence of Japanese colonialism tauntingly lingers in their minds and souls. Lee Yong-su, in a 2015 interview, testifies, “For us, the war has not ended yet. When our issue is resolved, then the war is ended.”18 

Many conversations regarding ‘comfort women’ often do not recognize the plight of the women who were born and raised in the northern sector of Korea before its division in 1945. Gil Won-ok, born in North Korea, was forced into Japanese sex slavery at just thirteen years old.19 In a 2015 interview, she states, “I want to go back home. I left home when I was thirteen. And seventy years [have] passed since liberation, but I still can’t go to my home in Pyongyang.”20 Gil Won-ok represents the hundreds upon thousands of ‘comfort women’ who could not return home after August 15, otherwise known as Korean Liberation Day. Establishing the Butterfly Fund in 2012 alongside (now-deceased) Kim Bok-dong, who donated all her life savings of KRW 50,000,000 (44,700 USD) to the Fund, her advocacy work mirrors hope for survivors of sexual violence across the globe.21  

The Contronym in ‘Comfort’

The etymology of the word comfort can be traced back to the Old French noun confort, meaning to provide consolation and support.22 It is necessary to acknowledge the power through which language holds in history and its ability to characterize victims during mass atrocities and wars. Before analyzing specific Japanese political officials’ public addresses in regards to ‘comfort women,’ the history of the term ‘comfort women,’ in itself, must be tackled. 

In August of 1944, the Japanese government declared the creation of the Women’s Volunteer Labor Corps, conscripting Korean women into their Imperial Army. However, records from the Foundation for Victims of Forced Mobilization by Imperial Japan found that around 53,000 Koreans during 1910-1945, including women, were conscripted to work for their war factories before the Women’s Volunteer Labor Corps was even officially established.23 This was Japan’s system of mobilizing thousands of Koreans into forced labor, through which many of the women were deceived into believing they were sent away from their homes for work when, indeed, they were being exploited for sex by the Japanese military. Thus, the term ‘comfort women’ was born to differentiate the women who were forced solely into factory labor and those who were compelled for wartime sexual servitude. 

Why would people mark these survivors and victims as ‘comfort women’ when there is no comfort or peace in sex slavery? Such a question perhaps remains slightly unresolved. At a hearing before the European Parliament on December 6, 2007, Ellen van der Ploeg, a Dutch woman who was forced into a ‘comfort station,’ testified: 

One day, one of the Japanese officers lined all the young girls up and pointed at several girls, including me, unfortunately. The officers gave us a new name…it was ‘comfort women.’ ‘Comfort women,’ how could they use this beautiful name for me? I was not a woman who consoled someone. I was not even just a slave; I was a sex slave.24 

Another survivor, Lee Yong-su, testified, “I have my own name, Lee Yong-su, that my mother and father gave me. So why am I a ‘comfort woman’ for the dirty Japanese army? I was dragged away by the Japanese army in the middle of the night while I was sleeping. I am not a ‘comfort woman.’ I am Lee Yong-su.”25

Imperial Japan selectively opted to use the euphemism ‘comfort women’ not only to pigeonhole and circumscribe these young girls but also because they knew it would be a potent tool in contorting their history. The creation of this word was, in fact, the beginning of the nation’s efforts to revise its global role in World War II into one that is powerful yet benevolent.

The query of what to call these victims was first earnestly discussed in August 1992 at The First Asian Solidarity Conference on the Issue of the Women Drafted for the Japanese Military in Seoul.26 Survivors across the Asia-Pacific joined the conference but could not arrive at a finalized conclusion. In October of the following year, the women assembled at The Second Asian Solidarity Conference in Tokyo, through which they decreed to keep the name ‘comfort women’ since it was already in wide use but made sure to add quotation marks.27 At the conference, they additionally declared the formal English term for this wartime apparatus: “Military Sexual Slavery by Japan.” Thereafter, international bodies and organizations such as the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Commission began to use “Military Sexual Slavery by Japan” as the official English description of such a system.28

Post-World War II Response from 1945-1989

The four decades before the 1990s (1945-1989) were clouded with ignorance as no Korean or Japanese official publicly spoke on the ‘comfort women’ issue.

After World War II, Japanese governmental elites were shaken by the Douglas McArthur administration’s (Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers) revocation of their state’s right to wage war on other nations.29 So much so, Japan began generating images of how the country was victimized and misled by western expansionism because, to them, they were ‘peace-loving people.’30 Thus, the Japanese government’s humiliation manifested in the systematic destruction of wartime information and materials, disregarding any ‘comfort women’ records in the pursuit of propaganda.31 In fact, from 1945 to the 1980s, there were no mentions of ‘comfort women’ in Japanese middle schools’ learning materials.32 

There are multiple textbook reasons as to why the government sought to delegitimize or even ‘forget’ the existence of these women, one being that the Tokyo Tribunals in 1946-1948 failed to acknowledge wartime rape as a crime.33 Although the trial, ordered by MacArthur, charged the arrests of General Hideki Tojo and multiple Imperial military officers, the ‘comfort women’ cases were neither tried nor brought up.34 In the end, the tribunal heard 419 witnesses and saw 4,336 counts of evidence for their crimes, through which seven defendants were hung, and sixteen defendants were sentenced to life in prison.35 Koreans and other nations abroad, however, understood that the trial’s shortcomings were large because it overlooked sexual slavery and failed to punish the remaining Japanese war criminals. 

‘Comfort women’ were not seriously brought up by the Court, one main reason being the United States knew Japan as a vital anti-Communist ally in the Asia-Pacific and thus “pressured Asian allies to not raise [further] issues of reparations for war crimes committed by Japan.”36 As the years passed, the Japanese government even advocated for the ‘justice’ of sentenced officials and officers, claiming they should be pensioned, released, sanctified, and revered as wartime heroes.37 A large majority of those criminals who passed were buried in Tokyo’s Shinto Yasukuni Shrine, now known to the majority of the world as a site of nationalist worship for war crime perpetrators and apologists.38 

Additionally, the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK), otherwise known as the Normalization Treaty, was another major setback in platforming the ‘comfort women’ issue. The indenture began under the leadership of the U.S. in 1951, and negotiations went on for fourteen years with numerous revisions and vicissitudes. Both Japanese and Korean people opposed the treaty, for distinct reasons however. 

Koreans began protesting against the agreement after the government announced its policy in 1964; dissidents argued that the normalization of Korean and Japanese diplomacy would greatly harm the nation because it dismissed Japan’s hegemony and created a pseudo-alliance solely to prop up South Korea as a newly capitalist state.39 Tensions escalated when students marched into the Government-General of Chōsen Building, or The Japanese General Government, in Seoul, destroying the police station while protesting.40 As a result, Park Chung-hee, President of the ROK at the time, declared “a state of emergency and nationwide martial law” and closed all schools to defeat the protests.41 

Inevitably, on August 14, 1965, the Normalization Treaty was ratified and thus legally neutralized the two countries’ relationship, cementing diplomatic ties that would further advance “their mutual welfare and common interests.”42 The Japanese government, under the agreement, gave South Korea 300 million United States Dollars (USD) and 200 million USD in loans over a decade as a ‘monetary apology’ for the thirty-five years of occupation and colonial dominion.43 Thereby, South Korea could also waive the right to declare further restitution.44

However, the money was not given as compensation to the civilians directly harmed by the Japanese Empire, and no funds was paid to any survivors of the wartime sex slavery system since the issue was not even mentioned during the treaty consultations.45 The money would, instead, be utilized to boost South Korean development and economy, thus forestalling the eventual exposure of ‘comfort women’ by over two decades. 

1990s Exposure

The global conscience of Japan’s sex slavery network radically opened as the 1990s emerged. As women across the world began sharing harrowing accounts of the abuse and rape they endured, their testimonies were the driving factor that merited great international attention to the issue of ‘comfort women’ across the Asia-Pacific. 

Quite frankly, the first recorded public discussion of the issue in Korea was in 1988, when an international panel was held examining the exploitation of sex tourism across the globe.46 Feminist Professor Yun Chung-ok joined the meeting and even met with Matsui Yayori, a prominent Japanese anti-imperialist journalist and women’s rights advocate. Two years later, in January of 1990, Yun Chung-ok published a collection of reports titled “The Unquiet Remains of the Volunteer Corps” for Hankyoreh, a brand new Korean newspaper at the time.47 Yun’s expositions stimulated great national rage towards the Japanese military, even pressuring Japan’s women’s rights groups to push their government to recognize sex slavery as an act of barbarity and wartime violence.48 Just ten months after Yun’s publication (November 16, 1990), The Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan (The Korean Council) was established.49 

Soon enough, survivors began to step forward to reveal the Japanese government’s formidable censorship and erasure of their existence. The first victim to jolt the movement for the justice of ‘comfort women’ forward was none other than Kim Hak-soon. On August 14, 1991, Kim gave an inceptive public testimony at a Seoul open press conference, garnering mass international awareness of the subject.50 Kim Hak-soon was, in fact, the only plaintiff to use her actual name in a lawsuit urging compensation for Asia-Pacific War survivors.51 For The Global Connections for Women Foundation, Alexis Dudden, a history professor teaching Japanese-Korean relations at the University of Connecticut, states:

She remains one of the bravest people of the 20th century. Kim Hak-soon’s initial statement propelled researchers to unearth documentary evidence to support her claims, which began the still-ongoing process of holding the Japanese government accountable for what the United Nations defines as a war crime and crime against humanity.52

“On Wednesdays, We Wear Yellow”

Even before survivors recalled their haunting experiences to the world, South Korean President Roh Tae-woo visited Japan in 1990 and requested a list of ‘comfort women’ with which their Imperial Army raped and sexually exploited. However, Japan insisted there was no such record or establishment of sex slavery under their military.53 Korean civilians even began to feel as if their own government was responding to Japan’s revisionist narration of history with sheer passivity. The ROK idly sat without further interrogation on Japan for their distortion of historical evidence, leaving nothing but grassroots women’s organizations to lead the struggle for the justice of ‘comfort women.’ 

The Korean Council became a crucial resource for these victims. The organization organized protest demonstrations and began fundraisers and ‘healing events,’ such as the Human Rights Camps.54 The council additionally established the ‘Comfort Women’ Hotline in 1991, becoming an indispensable platform for survivors to testify and share their experiences with the public.55 Women were finally granted the power of voice, gaining a sense of autonomy that Japan sought to steal ever since the existence of their wartime sexual slavery network. Legislation was also advocated and demanded by members of the council; organizers worked alongside politicians to pass the ‘Comfort Women’ Support Act of 1993, mandating the Korean government to support these survivors financially.56 

Ever-historic, the fight for the justice of ‘comfort women’ has remained ceaseless until absolute liberation. The very first Wednesday Demonstration occurred on January 8, 1992, demanding state recognition, intense investigation, and complete responsibility for the WWII sex slavery system by the Japanese military and government.57 Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa was in Seoul when the first demonstration occurred, but while Miyazawa did not apologize, the Wednesday Demonstrations have resolutely carried on each Wednesday at noon ever since. 

Protestors wear yellow vests and hold up yellow butterfly signs on the street as a symbol of resistance against the sexual violence and denigration of not only Korean ‘comfort women’ but also millions of women and girls across the globe.58 Survivors have been the leading face of these protests, showcasing grassroots initiatives’ utter vigor and potency in fighting against women’s injustice worldwide. Due to the people’s unwavering commitment to the Wednesday Demonstrations, Japanese officials’ attempts to disengage in ‘comfort women’ discussions for diplomatic optics were finally shattered. The government could no longer maintain the facade of political purity as the world initiated pressure on the nation for accountability. 

After a 1991 investigation by Professor Yoshiaki Yoshimi revealed documents proving Japan’s sex slavery system, the government, on July 6, 1992, officially announced the results to the public, known as The Kato Statement.59 Prime Minister Miyazawa circumvented making the statement himself by putting forth Chief Cabinet Secretary Koichi Kato: 

The inquiry has revealed that the Government had been involved in the establishment of comfort stations, the control of those who recruited comfort women, the construction and reinforcement of comfort facilities, the management and surveillance of comfort stations, the hygiene maintenance in comfort stations and among comfort women, and the issuance of identification as well as other documents to those who were related to comfort stations.

The Government again would like to express its sincere apology and remorse to all those who have suffered indescribable hardship as so-called ‘wartime comfort women’ irrespective of their nationality or place of birth. With profound remorse and determination that such a mistake must never be repeated, Japan will maintain its stance as a pacifist nation and will endeavor to build up new future-oriented relations with the Republic of Korea and with other countries and regions in Asia. […]60

Prior to the investigation’s release, however, Miyazawa did state in a press conference, “Concerning the comfort women, I apologize from the bottom of my heart and feel remorse for those people who suffered indescribable hardships.”61 His statement, though an apology, was brief and did not garner mass global attention like the Kato Statement. 

Nevertheless, Koreans were not convinced by either Kato or Miyazawa’s announcements. They pointed out how Japan “maintained the position that ‘there was no coercion’” and that they “denied legal responsibility” by taking “an ambiguous stance” on formal compensations.62 These victims voluntarily became ‘comfort women’ because compulsion did not come into play, according to the Japanese. 

After significant censure from the global majority, Japan announced its landmark conclusion on the 1991 investigation. On August 4, 1993, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono released an official statement, known as the Kono Statement, saying:

As a result of the study, which indicates that comfort stations were operated in extensive areas for long periods, it is apparent that there existed a great number of comfort women. Comfort stations were operated in response to the request of the military authorities of the day. The then-Japanese military was, directly or indirectly, involved in the establishment and management of the comfort stations and the transfer of comfort women. The recruitment of the comfort women was conducted mainly by private recruiters who acted in response to the request of the military. The Government study has revealed that in many cases, they were recruited against their own will, through coaxing coercion, etc., and that, at times, administrative/military personnel directly took part in the recruitments. They lived in misery at comfort stations under a coercive atmosphere.

  Undeniably, this was an act, with the involvement of the military authorities of the day, that severely injured the honor and dignity of many women. The Government of Japan would like to take this opportunity once again to extend its sincere apologies and remorse to all those, irrespective of place of origin, who suffered immeasurable pain and incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort women. […]63

Although Kono claimed Japan would “face squarely the historical facts…instead of evading them,” survivors across the Asia-Pacific were angered by the address’s lack of accountability. Victims pointed out how Kono crafted a significant oversight by saying Japanese officials only ‘took part’ in the wartime rape, implying that the country held partial, not complete, responsibility for wartime sexual servitude.64 Another primary flaw survivors publicized was that the government failed to admit the systematic abduction of these young girls by shifting culpability onto “private recruiters.” People have mostly viewed these statements as a pursuit of Japanese likeability and, thus, have not been regarded as sincere or contrite. 

Asian Women’s Fund and Japanese Contortion

Despite continued public pressure, the Japanese government would instate no policies for legal reparations; instead, they would establish the Asian Women’s Fund (AWF), which propelled much outward criticism and disappointment. 

When Tomiichi Murayama became Prime Minister of Japan in 1994, survivors of Japan’s sex slavery apparatus were optimistic about his approach to reconciliation for the issue. Supposedly a vehement Socialist who called for complete reparations from the Japanese government, Murayama was welcomed by Korean citizens.65 His pro-redress policies bolstered his popularity amongst women’s rights advocates worldwide, but his proposals were revealed to have not been fortified with much legitimacy. Just a month into office, many Koreans believed Murayama compromised his platform, which once claimed to have wanted the Japanese government to accept full legal accountability.  

Under his leadership, The 50th Anniversary Postwar Project was established, and the Asian Women’s Fund was born as a part of the project.66 The Fund had four main goals, according to Japanese officials:

(i) the Fund will call for donations from a wide spectrum of Japanese society as a way to enact the Japanese people’s atonement for the former comfort women; (ii) the Fund will support those conducting medical and welfare projects and other similar projects which are of service to former comfort women, through the use of governmental funding and other funds; (iii) when these projects are implemented, the Government will express the nation’s feeling of sincere remorse and apology to the former comfort women; and (iv) the Government will collate historical documents relating to the comfort women, to serve as a lesson of history.67

The money collected by the AWF was “through personal donations,” and thus, Koreans checked this as another ruse by the Japanese government to escape full legal resolution and responsibility.68 The Asia-Pacific Journal Japan Focus (APJJF), a Japan-favorable publication, states, “Many, therefore, denounced it as a devious attempt to evade full and proper legal responsibility and rejected the solatium or ‘sympathy’ payments as an inadequate substitute for full compensation by way of legal right.”69 

Murayama’s administration received both international and national objections. As early as July of 1994, forty human rights organizations from Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and other nations advocated for the complete cancellation of the AWF.70 They believed Japan’s state-sanctioned enslavement must be held to stringent legal and moral principles. Survivors like Kim Eun-rye protested in the Wednesday Demonstrations, opposing the Asian Women’s Funds for its bluff.71 Additionally, The Korean Council strictly rejected the project and said, “Japan’s move to procure funds in the form of private donations for compensation cannot be seen as anything but intentional manipulation to avoid official reparations.”72 

Despite twenty-eight Japanese organizations calling for the withdrawal of the AWF’s plan to deliver private “healing money,” the Fund proceeded on and began officially fundraising in 1995 up until 2007.73 Even conservatives in Japan opposed the Fund, claiming the ‘comfort women’ issue was “nonexistent” and therefore illegitimate in resolving.74 

On January 11, 1997, administrators from the AWF covertly met with and delivered private donations to seven ‘comfort women’ in Seoul. The Japanese government would go on to construct a deceiving narrative, claiming “Korean society was bullying the victims who accepted the Asian Women Fund.”75 Women’s rights organizations expressed how they believe Japan painted a portrait that made Korean civilians seem like hostile aggressors unable to accept peace. They pointed out how the survivors who rejected the money were, in actuality, berated and threatened not by Koreans but by Japanese AWF officials. The AWF utilized coercion to compel victims to accept the cash; survivor Hwang Geum-ju accounts, “Even when I demanded [to know] who he was, there was no answer, just him threatening me saying, ‘Halmoni [grandma], what kind of money you got that you don’t take the fund money?’, then hanging up.”76  

The Asian Women’s Fund declared they paid 258 survivors across the Asia-Pacific, installed medical welfare for seventy-nine ‘comfort women’ in the Netherlands, and financed the Red Cross of Indonesia to construct a nursing home unrelated to sex slavery victims.77 However, the evidence is unclear on how many of, and in what manner, the survivors were actually paid.78 

For instance, survivor Sim Dal-yeon testified how an official from AWF “took her name stamp and a copy of her identification card, saying he would retrieve the funds from the Japanese government for her.”79 She was illiterate and held no conviction or suspicion against the man; however, by the following year, Sim had not received any funds even though AWF records claimed otherwise. It was later revealed that her money was, instead, given to a Korean man who had no relation to Sim.  An Asian Women’s Fund official scapegoated the Korean Council for this accident, claiming the council’s hostility and uncooperative behavior caused the mistransaction of funds, whereas Filipino organizations were heavily involved in the fund distribution process. Hence, people are unsure of how many other survivors did not receive the promised donations.

Trials and Tribulations

On December 25, 1992, ten Korean women issued a lawsuit, known as the Shimonoseki Trial, against the Japanese government, pleading for an official apology and ¥564 million (US $6.66 million) in compensation for the wartime abuse they endured.81 Among the ten plaintiffs, three were ‘comfort women.’ They claimed Japan infringed a global treaty banning compulsory labor and sought compensation for their psychological and physiological torture.82 The Court eventually ruled, in April 1998, that Japan must distribute ¥300,000 (US $2,800.00) to each of the three ‘comfort women.’83 

However, the plaintiffs believed ¥300,000 was not enough to compensate for the victims’ post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and was “an insult to the women and their suffering,” thus issuing an appeal to the Hiroshima High Court that May.84 In March 2001, though, The Hiroshima High Court rescinded and overturned the April 1998 ruling, rejecting the appeal and initial lawsuit entirely.85 The Court’s judge claimed the Constitution did not explicitly state that the government was mandated to instate such a law.86 

The very next month, two of the ‘comfort women’ appealed further to the Japanese Supreme Court, saying the March 2001 ruling was unconstitutional, but their efforts were diminished as their plea was rejected in March of 2003. The Court additionally repealed the April 1998 ruling, the sole court ruling at that time that ordered Japan to compensate the plaintiffs.87 

21st Century Censorship

The wartime sex slavery apparatus under Japanese jurisdiction had been outwardly silenced for the motive of ‘international peace,’ but whose peace was the government toying with? As the 21st Century roared open, the subject of ‘comfort women’ remained and continues to remain a dire issue. 

Shinzo Abe became Japan’s Prime Minister in September of 2006 and became infamous for his role in systematically denying the existence of ‘comfort women’ under the Japanese Imperial Army. In 2007, before the confirmation of the U.S. House Resolution 121 for the resolution of the ‘comfort women’ issue, Abe stated, “No evidence has been found that indicates coercion in the narrow sense. There was no coercion of the sort where officials forced their way into houses and abducted women. We will not apologize even if the resolution was passed in the United States.”88 He failed to acknowledge Japan’s violation of various international treaties and establishments that banned sex trafficking, such as the International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children.89 Abe’s statement could readily be disproven by records used in international and national courts. A Dutch government report from Bart van Ploelgeest explains:

In March 1942, in Blora, 20 European women were detained in 2 buildings by a Japanese troop during the Japanese invasion of Java. At least 14 women were raped by soldiers for three weeks. In April 1944, in Semarang, the Japanese military and civilian policemen arrested hundreds of women…17 of them were sent to a ‘comfort station’ in Flores Island and were forced into prostitution.90

On December 28, 2015, the Korea-Japan ‘Comfort Women’ Agreement was announced to the public as a treaty to ‘irreversibly solve’ and ‘end the dispute.’91 According to the agreement, the Japanese government would give the South Korean government one billion Japanese Yen (JYP). They planned to establish the Reconciliation and Healing Foundation with the money, which would distribute funds to the surviving victims.92 Japan would financially support the foundation on the consensus that the two nations would no longer concern the issue ever again.93 The treaty was declared without any consultation of the Korean ‘comfort women,’ and therefore, failed to reach survivors’ demands, global standards of candor, justice reparations, warrants of non-recurrence, and a survivor-centered procedure.94  The agreement was not an official apology and did not declare formal recognition of such crimes; Japanese Foreign Minister at the time, Fumio Kishida, even stated to reporters, “They are not reparations.”95 

Additionally, just three weeks after the treaty, Shinzo Abe spoke to the Japanese National Assembly, saying, “There was no document found that the comfort women were forcibly taken away.”96 His statement blatantly contradicted the objectives listed in the 2015 agreement, which claimed to recover the “dignity and heal the psychological wounds” of the survivors. 

Around nine months after the treaty, Korea requested Abe to write a formal letter of regret directly to the victims. Still, Abe replied dismissively, “I have no intention of apologizing again.”97 Three days later, Sankei Shimbun, a Japanese publication with right-wing inclinations, cited officials close to Abe that “the comfort women agreement was a gamble that Prime Minister Abe makes to keep South Korea silent.”98 Evidently, the Japanese government used the agreement for political optics rather than to express its sincere remorse. 

International bodies also took a stance in criticizing Japan’s lackluster accountability. United Nations human rights experts stated that the 2015 treaty did “not meet standards of State accountability for gross human rights violations and was reached without a proper consultation process.”99 In fact, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination raised its apprehension:

…the Committee is concerned at reports that these efforts do not take a fully victim-centered approach, that the surviving ‘comfort women’ were not adequately consulted, and that this solution did not provide unequivocal responsibility for the human rights violations committed against these women by the military before and during WWII…statements of some public officials minimiz[ed] the responsibility of the Government in respect to ‘comfort women’ and their potential negative impact on survivors.100

The Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs Task Force revealed, in 2017, undisclosed parts of the 2015 agreement, showing how the Japanese government asked the ROK to “not support civic groups that oppose the agreement, to stop using the term ‘sexual slavery,’ and to make detailed plans regarding the Statue of Peace.”101 

Further concerns were raised by human rights officials such as Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, during the Human Rights Council’s 31st session in 2016:

Its [2015 agreement] terms have been questioned by various UN human rights mechanisms, and most importantly, by the survivors themselves. It is fundamentally important that the relevant authorities reach out to these courageous and dignified women; ultimately, only they can judge whether they have received genuine redress.102 

Other experts’ positions on the treaty were stated at the Council. One explained:

We believe the agreement between Japan and South Korea falls short of meeting the demands of survivors. An unequivocal official apology recognizing the full responsibility of the then-Japanese Government and military. As well as adequate reparations would protect and uphold the victims’ right to truth, justice, and reparation.103

After the agreement, Japan failed to address these grievances earnestly and proceeded to relentlessly distort, deny, and revise the history of ‘comfort women’ in their wartime sex slavery machine. The government began interfering with the 2012 Butterfly Fund and attempted to stop the construction of the Statue of Peace—a statue that honors ‘comfort women’ and symbolizes their ongoing struggle for justice.104  

Japanese Officials’ Systematic Denialism

Japanese high officials have long repudiated the existence of ‘comfort women,’ but many may assume such denialism only occurred far back in the 20th century. However, nothing could be further from reality. 

In the 2016 Japanese National Diet, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe claimed, “There is no change in my position that no evidence has been found to prove the so-called forceful mobilization of comfort women among the documents that [the] Japanese government [has] produced so far.”105 

Sakurada Yoshitaka, the former Ministerial member of the Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology Ministry of Japan, stated in 2016, “Comfort women were professional prostitutes. They pretended to be victims. We have been deceived too much by propaganda maneuvers.”106 

Shinozuka Takashi, the former General Counselor of the Japanese Consulate in Atlanta, Georgia, in 2017 expressed:

According to the investigation done by the Japanese government in [the] 1990s and 2000s, it is not yet confirmed that 200,000 sex slaves were mobilized. Even the South Korean government has not yet discovered evidence. The number of Comfort Women is not 200,000, and they are neither sex slaves nor forcibly 

mobilized.107

Contortion of History Textbooks

Knowledge is power, so the education of devastating global disasters and tyrannical establishments is indispensable in ensuring that further obstructions to humanity cease. 

Nonetheless, Japanese historical revisionists made sure to omit any details on their Imperial Army’s sex slavery machine in middle school textbooks up until 2012.108 Survivors, advocates, and UN Committees have persisted, demanding the Japanese government educate their citizens on their violent role in World War II. But by 2020, “only two Japanese middle school textbooks that have passed the government authorization process contain descriptions of the Japanese military sexual slavery system.”109 

The 2009 United Nations NGO Shadow Report to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) elucidates Japan’s systematic revising of its history, saying:

After Chief Cabinet Secretary KONO Yohei issued an official statement (the ‘Kono Statement’) in August 1993, which acknowledged the involvement of the government and military of Japan and the use of force in the ‘comfort women’ system, descriptions of the ‘comfort women’ appeared in all the seven textbooks approved by the Education and Science Ministry for use in junior high schools (the last phase of mandatory education) by 1997. However, references to the ‘comfort women’ issue have been gradually erased. In February 2004, the Minister of Education even stated: ‘It is wonderful that words like ‘military comfort women’ and ‘forced recruitment’ no longer appear in most textbooks.’ In the textbooks used in 2006, the phrase ‘comfort women’ was completely gone, and weakened descriptions (without using the phrase) remained in only two textbooks. This means that only 17.3% of students in junior high school [have] the opportunity to learn anything about the fact of [the] ‘comfort women’ system now.110

Therefore, with only nine Korean documented ‘comfort women’ known to be alive in 2024, the struggle for absolute responsibility by the Japanese government remains.111 Japan’s methodical and propagandistic erasure of history continues to be tackled, exposed, and fought against by survivors and advocates worldwide. 

Conclusion

The fight for the justice of ‘comfort women’ across the Asia-Pacific remains steadfast in Korea, indubitably including not only women abused by the Japanese Imperial Army and government but also Vietnamese victims raped and dehumanized by the South Korean military and the United States’s puppeteering.112 This paper has offered a glimpse into the history of Japanese hegemony and its act of concealing reputable data regarding ‘comfort women.’

The question remains on what exactly Japan must do in response to their crimes of rape, sexual torture, and murder. After two years have passed since Shinzo Abe’s assassination in July 2022, current Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has essentially remained silent on the protests for the examination of Japan’s historic denialism and has refused to issue a full apology.113 International law explicitly states that “war crimes have a legal obligation to provide reparations.”114 Yet, many still wonder if such a thing as ‘reparation’ could truly heal the unspeakable terrors of trauma these women have and continue to endure. 

As Japan proceeds to obscure the fundamental exigence behind why they established treaties such as the Korea-Japan ‘Comfort Women’ Agreement of 2015, advocates search and discover the cracks in Japan’s global facade of ‘polite’ power. The nation’s dubious historical narration warrants a thorough dissection of its state-instated propaganda. Though the Imperial Japanese Empire is no longer formally in reign, its generational hegemony continues to gash the souls of the few remaining survivors abroad. Ultimately, as global justice bodies have continued to demonstrate un-abating support for ‘comfort women,’ the lukewarm Korean youth, in return, have increasingly become ignited to interrogate Japanese state censorship proactively and involve themselves in worldwide human rights affairs. 

Endnotes:

1 Kim, Koonja, “Surviving Comfort Woman,” (Speaking While Female, 2007), Accessed July 10, 2024, https://speakingwhilefemale.co/violence-kim1/. 

2 Sumikawa, Shunsuke, “The Meiji Restoration: Roots of Modern Japan” (Lehigh University, 1999): 1. 

3 Ibid., 2. 

4 Giles, Nathaniel W., “The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere: The Failure of Japan’s ‘Monroe Doctrine’ for Asia” (East Tennessee State University, 2015), Accessed July 10, 2024, https://dc.etsu.edu/honors/295.

5 Richter, Steffi, Contested Views of a Common Past: Revisions of History in Contemporary East Asia (University of Leipzig, 2008): 1-2., Accessed July 10, 2024, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/37721775_Contested_Views_of_a_Common_Past_Revisions_of_History_in_Contemporary_East_Asia.

6 Nilsson, Jeanna, No comfort in history: The Korean comfort women, memory politics and reconciliation between Japan and South Korea (Malmö University, 2014): 6-7.

7 Soh, Sarah, The Comfort Women (University of Chicago Press, 2008): 21. 

8 Nilsson, Jeanna, No comfort in history: The Korean comfort women, memory politics and reconciliation between Japan and South Korea (Malmö University, 2014): 6.

9 Lee, K., Hahn,. Bae-ho, Lee,. Ki-baik, Lew,. Young Ick and Lee,. Jung Ha., “Korea.” (Encyclopedia Britannica, May 31, 2024), Accessed July 11, 2024, https://www.britannica.com/place/Korea.

10 “Allied Occupation of Korea, 1945-1948 | Wilson Center Digital Archive” (Wilson Center), Accessed July 11, 2024, https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/topics/allied-occupation-korea-1945-1948. 

11 Ibid. 

12 Kim, Joungwon Alexander, Divided Korea: The Politics of Development, 1945–1972. 1st ed. Vol. 59. (Harvard University Asia Center, 1975.): 47, Accessed July 13, 2024, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1tg5kpz.

13 Ibid., 47-48.

14 Ibid., 50-76.

15 Young, Benjamin R., “The War that Never Ended: The Legacy of the Korean War” (Origins Education, 2024), Accessed July 13, 2024, https://origins.osu.edu/read/war-never-ended-legacy-korean-war#:~:text=From%20July%201951%20until%20the,War%20has%20never%20officially%20ended

16 Congressional Research Service, U.S.-South Korea Alliance: Issues for Congress (Congressional Research Service, 2023), Accessed July 13, 2024, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11388#:~:text=Currently%2C%20approximately%2028%2C500%20U.S.%20troops,military%20base%20in%20the%20world.

17 Lee, Sook-Jong, “Growing Anti-US Sentiments Roil Alliance With South Korea” (YaleGlobal Online, 2004), Accessed July 14, 2023, https://archive-yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/growing-anti-us-sentiments-roil-alliance-south-korea.

18 Yoon, Mee-Hyang, 25 Years of Wednesdays (The Korean Council, 2016): 262.

19 Kim, Kyung-Hoon, “‘Comfort women’ recount abuse” (Reuters, 2015), Accessed July 14, 2024, https://widerimage.reuters.com/story/comfort-women-recount-abuse.

20 Yoon, Mee-Hyang, 25 Years of Wednesdays (The Korean Council, 2016): 262.

21 Melvin, Kathy, “Comfort women: The human face of war in Korea” (Presbyterian Mission, 2017), Accessed July 14, 2024, https://www.presbyterianmission.org/story/comfort-women-human-face-war-korea/.

22 Merriam-Webster, “comfort” (Merriam-Webster), Accessed July 15, 2024, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/comfort.

23 Yoon, Mee-Hyang, 25 Years of Wednesdays (The Korean Council, 2016): 44-48.

24 Ibid., 50.

25 Ibid., 51.

26 Ibid., 55-56.

27 Ibid., 56.

28 Ibid.

29 Ebrey, Patricia Buckley; Walthall, Anne; Palais, James, Modern East Asia: A Cultural, Social, and Political History, Vol. 2: From 1600 (Cengage Learning edition 2, 2005): 391.

30 Henry, Nicola, “Memory of an Injustice: The ‘Comfort Women’ and the Legacy of the Tokyo Trial” (Asian Studies Review, 2013): 374, Accessed July 15, 2024, https://doi.org/10.1080/10357823.2013.771770.

31 Berger, Thomas U, War, Guilt, World Politics after World War II (Cambridge University Press, 2012): 51.

32 Nilsson, Jeanna, No comfort in history: The Korean comfort women, memory politics and reconciliation between Japan and South Korea (Malmö University, 2014): 22.

33 May, Larry, Crimes Against Humanity (Cambridge University Press, 2004): 102.

34 The National WWII Museum New Orleans, “Tokyo War Crimes Trial” (The National WWII Museum New Orleans), Accessed July 16, 2024, https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/topics/tokyo-war-crimes-trial.

35 Ibid.

36 The Korean Council, A to Z Guide For Just Resolution of the Japanese Military Sexual Slavery Issue (The Korean Council, 2020): 68.

37 Dudden, Alexis, Troubled Apologies Among Japan, Korea, and the United States (Columbia University Press, 2008): 117, Accessed July 16, 2024, https://doi.org/10.7312/dudd14176.

38 May, Larry, Crimes Against Humanity (Cambridge University Press, 2004): 102.

39 Yoon, Mee-Hyang, 25 Years of Wednesdays (The Korean Council, 2016): 256.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

42 United Nations, JAPAN and REPUBLIC OF KOREA Treaty on Basic Relations. Signed at Tokyo, on 22 June 1965 (United Nations, Volume 8471, 1996), Accessed July 16, 2024, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20583/volume-583-I-8471-English.pdf.

43 Nilsson, Jeanna, No comfort in history: The Korean comfort women, memory politics and reconciliation between Japan and South Korea (Malmö University, 2014): 23.

44 Yoshiaka, Yoshimi, Comfort Women (Columbia University Press, 2002): 194.

45 Yoon, Mee-Hyang, 25 Years of Wednesdays (The Korean Council, 2016): 257.

46 Soh, Sarah, The Comfort Women (University of Chicago Press, 2008): 124. 

47 Mitchell, Richard H.; Hicks, George, The Comfort Women: Japan’s Brutal Regime of Enforced Prostitution in the Second World War (The American Historical Review, Volume 102, Issue 2, April 1997): 55, Accessed July 17, 2024, https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/102.2.503.

48 Nozaki, Yoshiko, The ‘Comfort Women’ Controversy: History And Testimony (Sense Publishers, Asia-Pacific Journal Japan Focus, Volume 3 | Issue 7, 2005), Accessed July 17, 2024, https://apjjf.org/yoshiko-nozaki/2063/article.

49 Lee, Jae-Eun, “Korean Council for Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery” (People Power 21, 2001), Accessed July 17, 2024, https://www.peoplepower21.org/english/37829?ckattempt=2.

50 Choe, Sang-Hun, “Overlooked No More: Kim Hak-soon, Who Broke the Silence for ‘Comfort Women’” (The New York Times, 2021), Accessed July 17, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/21/obituaries/kim-hak-soon-overlooked.html.

51 Digital Museum, The Comfort Women Issue and The Asian Women’s Fund, “How did the Comfort Women Issue come to light?” (Asian Women’s Fund), Accessed July 17, 2024, https://www.awf.or.jp/e2/survey.html.

52 Avishi, “Kim Hak-Soon, Who Broke the Silence for ‘Comfort Women’” (The Global Connections for Women Foundation, 2021), Accessed July 17, 2024, https://gc4women.org/2021/11/08/kim-hak-soon-who-broke-the-silence-for-comfort-women/.

53 Álvarez, Nerea, “‘Comfort Women’, Difficulty in Korean-Japanese Relations” (Universidad de Navarra), Accessed July 18, 2024, https://en.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/detalle/-/blogs/-mujeres-confort-dificultad-en-las-relaciones-coreano-japonesas?_com_liferay_blogs_web_portlet_BlogsPortlet_redirect=https%3A%2F%2Fen.unav.edu%2Fen%2Fweb%2Fglobal-affairs%2Fdetalle%3Fp_p_id%3Dcom_liferay_blogs_web_portlet_BlogsPortlet%26p_p_lifecycle%3D0%26p_p_state%3Dmaximized%26p_p_mode%3Dview%26p_r_p_tag%3Dmujeres%2Bconfort%26_com_liferay_blogs_web_portlet_BlogsPortlet_cur%3D1%26_com_liferay_blogs_web_portlet_BlogsPortlet_delta%3D10.

54 Yoon, Mee-Hyang, 25 Years of Wednesdays (The Korean Council, 2016): 160.

55 Ibid.

56 Ibid.

57 The Korean Council, “Global Action Day Justice for ‘Comfort Women!’ Join the 1000th Wednesday Demonstration!” (The Korean Council, 2011), Accessed July 18, 2024, https://www.koreaverband.de/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/ComfortWomen_1000Dem_PR-from-Korea_Dec2011.pdf.

58 Wimmer, Marianne, “Visiting the ‘Comfort Women’ museum in Seoul” (International Association of Women’s Museums, 2020), Accessed July 18, 2024, https://iawm.international/3830/.

59 Yoon, Mee-Hyang, 25 Years of Wednesdays (The Korean Council, 2016): 235.

60 Kato, Koichi, “Statement by Chief Cabinet Secretary Koichi Kato on the Issue of the so-called ‘Wartime Comfort Women’ from the Korean Peninsula” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1992), Accessed July 19, 2024, https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/rp/page25e_000346.html.

61 Columbia Law School Center for Korean Legal Studies, “Japanese Government Statements and Ministry of Foreign Affairs Statements” (Columbia Law School), Accessed July 19, 2024, https://kls.law.columbia.edu/content/japanese-government-statements-and-ministry-foreign-affairs-statements

62 Yoon, Mee-Hyang, 25 Years of Wednesdays (The Korean Council, 2016): 236.

63 Digital Museum, The Comfort Women Issue and The Asian Women’s Fund, “Statement by Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono on the Result of the Study on the Issue of ‘Comfort Women’” (Asian Women’s Fund, 1993), Accessed July 20, 2024, https://www.awf.or.jp/e6/statement-02.html.

64 Yoon, Mee-Hyang, 25 Years of Wednesdays (The Korean Council, 2016): 238.

65 Ibid., 239.

66 Digital Museum, The Comfort Women Issue and The Asian Women’s Fund, “Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama on the “Peace, Friendship, and Exchange Initiative” (Asian Women’s Fund, 1994), Accessed July 20, 2024, https://awf.or.jp/e6/statement-04.html.

67 Im, Carolyn, dis-comfort women (Lulu, 2019): 40, Accessed July 21, 2024, https://books.google.com/books?id=LyXHDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA40&lpg=PA40&dq=The+Fund%27s+activities+fall+into+four+categories:+1.

68 Yoon, Mee-Hyang, 25 Years of Wednesdays (The Korean Council, 2016): 240.

69 Haruki, Wada, “The Comfort Women, The Asian Women’s Fund And The Digital Museum” (Asian-Pacific Journal Japan Focus, 2008), Accessed July 21, 2024, https://apjjf.org/wada-haruki/2653/article.

70 Yoon, Mee-Hyang, 25 Years of Wednesdays (The Korean Council, 2016): 240.

71 Ibid., 246.

72 Ibid., 240-241.

73 Ibid., 241.

74 Hunter, Wayne, “Termination Of The Asian Women’s Fund” (The Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan, 2007), Accessed July 21, 2024, https://archive.ph/20121219165557/http://www.fccj.or.jp/node/2106#selection-103.1-103.38.

75 Yoon, Mee-Hyang, 25 Years of Wednesdays (The Korean Council, 2016): 242.

76 Ibid., 243.

77 The Asian Women’s Fund, The ‘Comfort Women’ Issue and the Asian Women Fund Asian Women’s Fund): 21, Accessed July 22, 2024, https://www.awf.or.jp/pdf/0170.pdf.

78 Yoon, Mee-Hyang, 25 Years of Wednesdays (The Korean Council, 2016): 245.

79 Ibid., 244.

80 Ibid.

81 Columbia Law School Center for Korean Legal Studies, “Japanese Government Statements and Ministry of Foreign Affairs Statements” (Columbia Law School), Accessed July 22, 2024, https://kls.law.columbia.edu/content/japanese-government-statements-and-ministry-foreign-affairs-statements

82 The Associated Press, “Japan Court Backs 3 Brothel Victims” (The New York Times, 1998), Accessed July 23, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/1998/04/28/world/japan-court-backs-3-brothel-victims.html.

83 Ibid.

84 Columbia Law School Center for Korean Legal Studies, “Japanese Government Statements and Ministry of Foreign Affairs Statements” (Columbia Law School), Accessed July 23, 2024, https://kls.law.columbia.edu/content/japanese-government-statements-and-ministry-foreign-affairs-statements

85 Kyodo, “Hiroshima court overturns wartime sex slaves’ redress” (The Japan Times, 2001), Accessed July 24, 2024, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2001/03/30/national/hiroshima-court-overturns-wartime-sex-slaves-redress/.

86 Columbia Law School Center for Korean Legal Studies, “Japanese Government Statements and Ministry of Foreign Affairs Statements” (Columbia Law School), Accessed July 24, 2024, https://kls.law.columbia.edu/content/japanese-government-statements-and-ministry-foreign-affairs-statements

87 Ibid.

88 The Korean Council, A to Z Guide For Just Resolution of the Japanese Military Sexual Slavery Issue (The Korean Council, 2020): 48.

89 Ibid.

90 Ibid., 49.

91 Shin, Hyonhee, “South Korea court orders Japan to compensate ‘comfort women’, reverses earlier ruling” (Reuters, 2023), Accessed July 25, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/south-korea-court-orders-japan-compensate-comfort-women-reverses-earlier-ruling-2023-11-23/.

92 The Korean Council, A to Z Guide For Just Resolution of the Japanese Military Sexual Slavery Issue (The Korean Council, 2020): 75.

93 Ibid.

94 Ibid.

95 Ibid., 76.

96 Hosaka, Yuji, “Why Did the 2015 Japan-Korea ‘Comfort Women’ Agreement Fall Apart?” (The Diplomat, 2021), Accessed July 27, 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2021/11/why-did-the-2015-japan-korea-comfort-women-agreement-fall-apart/.

97 Ibid.

98 Ibid.

99 The Korean Council, A to Z Guide For Just Resolution of the Japanese Military Sexual Slavery Issue (The Korean Council, 2020): 76.

100 Ibid.

101 Ibid., 77.

102 Ibid., 78.

103 Ibid., 79.

104 Ibid., 81.

105 Ibid., 82.

106 Ibid.

107 Ibid.

108 Ibid., 83.

109 Ibid.

110 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, An NGO Shadow Report to CEDAW, Japan The ‘Comfort Women’ Issue (United Nations, 2009): 4, Accessed July 28, 2024, https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/ngos/comfortwomen_japan_cedaw44.pdf.

111 Ko, Byung-chan, “Another death leaves only 9 surviving Korean ‘comfort women’” (Hankyoreh, 2023), Accessed July 28, 2024, https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/1090418.html.

112 Yoon, Mee-Hyang, 25 Years of Wednesdays (The Korean Council, 2016): 280.

113 Kyodo, “Kishida says no plans to review Japan’s 1993 ‘comfort women’ apology” (The Japan Times, 2021), Accessed July 28, 2024, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/12/09/national/kishida-comfort-women/.

114 The Korean Council, A to Z Guide For Just Resolution of the Japanese Military Sexual Slavery Issue (The Korean Council, 2020): 87.

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